February 13, 2015 5:14 pm
The devilish detail of this document is highly advantageous to the Russians, writes Niall Ferguson
T
he world loves a peace agreement. The beauty of any deal like the Ukraine ceasefire agreed in the early hours of Thursday morning is that it can be presented in two equally interesting ways. Either it is “Camp David”, a transcendent moment of reconciliation between sworn enemies. Or it is “Munich”, a lapse back into the appeasement of dictators.
I have disappointing news. The Minsk agreement was neither. Russia and Ukraineare not about to make perpetual peace. Nor is Ukraine about to be carved up by Russian President Vladimir Putin, as Czechoslovakia was once carved up by Hitler with the connivance of Britain and France.
ON THIS STORY
- Ukraine fighting flares ahead of truce
- Siege mentality spawns new Donetsk identity
- Putin’s posture casts cloud over ceasefire
- European leaders cautious over ‘Minsk II’
- Rebels tout accord as path to recognition
ON THIS TOPIC
- Shaky ceasefire holds in east Ukraine
- Full text of the Minsk agreement
- Philip Stephens A half answer for Ukraine
- IMF unveils $17.5bn Ukraine rescue plan
IN OPINION
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Enough fairy tales. The Minsk deal was not even a formal agreement, according to some involved; more a to-do list that might (but might not) produce a truce in eastern Ukraine. Although the German chancellor and the French, Russian and Ukrainian presidents were present, they signed nothing. The document was agreed by representatives of the “contact group”, comprising the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ukraine and pro-Russia secessionist rebels fighting in the east.
In depth
Pro-Moscow separatists in eastern Ukraine have escalated the political turmoil that threatens to tear the country apart
Further reading
Further reading
The things to be done include the creation of a demilitarised zone in eastern Ukraine; an exchange of all prisoners of war; pardons for all individuals who might have committed war crimes; the resumption of economic relations between Kiev and the contested region of Donbass, comprising Donetsk and Lugansk; and a complex process of constitutional decentralisation to increase the political autonomy of Donbass.
To the armchair strategist, this all sounds fair enough. But read the small print. The original Minsk accords of September 2014 stated that Ukraine would regain full control of its national boundaries immediately — aside, of course, from the one around Crimea, annexed by Russia last year. But the new document delays the transfer of border control in Donbass until late 2015. Moreover, the separatists will gain control of 500 sq km of Ukrainian soil not included in the earlier agreement. Finally, all constitutional changes mandated by this week’s document must be approved by the separatists.
In short, the devilish detail of this document is highly advantageous to the Russians and their sidekicks. And that should not surprise us. For Ukraine’s position is a classic one in the history of international relations stretching back into antiquity: it is weak.
“You know as well as we do that right . . . is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” So said the coolly menacing Athenians to the doomed Melians in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. That is essentially how the Russian government feels about the Ukrainians.
President Petro Poroshenko is doing what he must. Had he rejected the terms on offer in Minsk, Ukrainian troops in the strategically important Donetsk town of Debaltseve might have faced annihilation. The Europeans would have blamed him for being intransigent. And one suspects Christine Lagarde, the International Monetary Fund managing director who on Thursday announced a $17.5bn “extended fund facility” for Ukraine, would have been less forthcoming. On Wednesday Mr Poroshenko was made an offer he could not refuse: no Minsk deal, no IMF dough.
Yet he knows that, aside from the cheque, all he has secured is a few diplomatic brownie points, not a genuine ceasefire. For there is no clear reason why the Russians should be more inclined to observe this one than the last. To see why, you need to appreciate what Mr Putin is trying to achieve. This is not further annexation of Ukrainian territory but the creation of a “frozen conflict” zone of semi-autonomous regions where the writ of Kiev does not run.
The big threat he faced a week ago was from the US Congress, where support for arming Ukraine has surged. It is not only Republican hawks such as Senator John McCain, who now want to arm Kiev. Even Harry Reid, the impeccably liberal Senate minority leader, has argued for doing so. So has Ashton Carter, US President Barack Obama’s incoming defence secretary.
The other threat Mr Putin faced was German indignation at his flouting of the last Minsk agreement. His response was to use diplomacy to drive a wedge between Europe and the US. Cross though she may be with him, Chancellor Angela Merkelsays she “cannot imagine any situation in which improved equipment for the Ukrainian army leads to President Putin being so impressed that he believes he will lose militarily”.
By inviting the chancellor and French President François Hollande to Moscow and then meeting them again in Minsk, Mr Putin has exploited this division to the full. He has significantly reduced the risk of US arms being sent to Ukraine. He has also lent credibility to Mr Obama’s new doctrine of “strategic patience”, unveiled last week.
The reality is that this strategy (also known as “dithering”) has allowed both Syria and Iraq to descend into chaos. Eastern Ukraine is well on its way in the same direction. Sadly, enough people in the west will swallow the fairy story of the Peace of Minsk to enable the harsh realities on the ground, like the small print of the document, to be overlooked.
The writer is Laurence A Tisch professor of History at Harvard. Jason Rockett contributed to this article
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